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A MONISTIC CONCEPTION OF A4IND.
BY THE EDITOR.
SCIENTISTS are agreed that the world-conception of science
must be unitary, it must be monism. But the difficulty so far
has been the formulation of the character of the one so as to show
the contrasts which obviously prevail in this unity. It is easy enough
to see that states of temperature are not components of heat and
cold, for the thermometer has taught us that there are degrees of
temperature ; but not everywhere can we comprehend at a glance
how the obvious facts upon which any kind of dualism attempts to
establish itself can be resolved into a unitary conception.
In the present number of Tlic Open Court Mr. W. P. Whery
points out the trinity of matter, energy and mind, and treats mind
as a kind of universal attribute of existence which of course can be
done if we stretch the definition of mind so as to suit this purpose.
The editor of The Open Court has published a synopsis of the phi-
losophy for which he stands and which he has endeavored to build
up as the philosophy, the philosophy of science which should be as
much a science as chemistry or mathematics ; and indeed the true
philosophy would be a combination of the two branches of scientific
thought, the purely formal sciences and the sciences of the various
realms of experience. In this pamphlet^ he has sketched his world-
view in the briefest possible compass and the main points which
stand in contrast to Mr. Whery's views shall be briefly indicated.
Mind, as we understand it, is absent in plants as well as in all
purely physical phenomena. It originates in animals, viz., in crea-
tures possessing sentiency. Accordingly we can not endorse what
' This synopsis has appeared first under the title Philosophy as a Science
and in a second edition The Philosophy of Form. The former contains a full
catalogue of the author's publications. The second is somewhat enlarged on a
few important points and yd is limited to 50 pages. (Open Court Publisliing
Company. Price 10 cents.)
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Mr. Whery says concerning certain phenomena which in our opinion
are non-mental.
The first obvious contrast in all existence is that between sub-
jectivity and objectivity, or states of innerness and external mani-
festations, the former developing into irritability, sentiency, feeling,
consciousness and self-consciousness, the latter being motions which
obey in all details the laws of mechanics. The that of existence
is called "matter," the actions of existence are summarily called
"energy." They may be at apparent rest as stresses or strains,
which means a tendency to act restrained by a counter-pressure.
This is potential energy and when energy actually produces a change
of place it is called kinetic energy.
Matter and energy are not things which as such can be produced
anywhere ; they are generalizations of all the many phenomena that
take place in the domain of objectivity, and every one of these phe-
nomena is in a definite place, in a definite time and of a definite form.
Time and place are formal relations. Accordingly we can summarize
the universal features of objective existence under the three heads,
matter, energy and form.
The several sciences investigate all the branches of objective
existence, and so far as they are concerned with concrete actualities
they are the science of experience, but so far as they concern the
nature of pure form we deal with such sciences as mathematics,
arithmetic, geometry, logic, etc. They are not based on sense ex-
perience but are mental constructions.
Objective and subjective existence are now commonly regarded
in scientific circles as two sides of one and the same process, and this
theory has been formulated as the principle of parallelism. But it
is understood that there is not a parallelism of two things running
side by side like two geometrical parallels, but that these two sides
of existence are two aspects of one and the same reality. The two
aspects are as different as the outside and inside of a curve. They
are different in character. Nevertheless neither exists without the
other. Thus every transaction in existence would not be unlike a
mathematical line AB. AB would be a subjective state while BA
presents itself as a definite form of matter in motion. The whole
world appears to us as definite forms of matter in motion. It con-
sists of objects and we can never observe with our senses souls,
feelings, emotions or any subjective states. We only see bodies
hustling around and changing. On the other hand within ourselves
we consist of more or less dim states of consciousness reaching
down into states of subconsciousness and strongly influenced by
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subliminal or unconscious states. Here the whole world appears
as a tapestry woven of thought.
The questions of idealism and materialism are gratuitous philo-
sophical somersaults. The objectivity of the outside world confronts
us and we call the thijigishness or the that or the actuality of exist-
ence by the general term "matter," and the changes of the several
objects we call energy. The reality of sense-impressions cannot
be doubted, and it is superfluous to propose the question whether
reality is real.
Objective experience knows nothing of mentality, but it de-
scribes and explains the order of the world as an intrinsic quality
which in objective existence is as necessary as the wonderful ar-
rangements of mathematics in pure thought. For instance magic
squares are as if preconceived by a master mathematician, and yet
their interrelations are products of an eternal and intrinsic necessity.
Where we have sentiency combined with the intrinsic mechanical
order that universally prevails in nature, mind originates. The in-
trinsic order produces first sentiency and then mentality. As ex-
plained in detail in the pamphlet referred to, animal organisms
render possible an interoperation of the subjective elements so as
to let inner states cooperate and render potential feelings actual.
Further, the preservation of form in organic structures becomes
memory as soon as it is accompanied by sentiency, in which case if
the same sense-impression presents itself to the senses it is felt to
be the same and thus becomes representative of the object that causes
it. As soon as sense-impressions become representative they become
mental phenomena. This is the origin of mind.
There is no need of entering into further details but we ought
to insist on the significance of the higher development of the human
mind which as a rule is so greatly neglected by monistic thinkers
as to cause the impression that monism is practically materialism.
